Environmental assessment (EA) is established in most countries as a procedure to ensure that administrative authorities are aware of the environmental impacts likely to result from the activities they approve. Many jurisdictions have moved towards including consideration for climate change mitigation in EA. Through a review of the law and practice of various States, this article suggests that such Climate Assessment is now emerging as a norm of customary international law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels for power generation or transportation result in the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) which interfere with our climate system. 2 This causes widespread and far-reaching adverse consequences on human societies and ecosystems, affecting future generations the most. 3 States have unanimously recognized the necessity of mitigating climate change and pledged to act accordingly. They did so by ratifying treaties such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 4 the Kyoto Protocol 5 and the Paris Agreement, 6 and by communicating unilateral declarations such as the Cancún Pledges and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).
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States are also bound by customary international law. In this regard, the due diligence obligation of a State within its territory 8 has been analysed as including a broad obligation to prevent excessive greenhouse gas emissions.
States have sought to comply with their obligations by adopting diverse measures. Most attention has focused on market-based mechanisms, implemented among others in the European Union, 10 some Northern-American regions 11 and China, 12 whereby public authorities issue a limited number of GHG emission allowances and regulate a secondary market. Elsewhere, economic incentives were imposed through taxes on GHG emissions and subsidies to alternative activities. 13 Yet, States have also used other tools, for instance their control over State-owned enterprises, 14 to reduce GHG emissions within their jurisdiction or under their control. This article focuses on an oft-neglected 15 tool for climate change mitigation, namely Environmental Assessment (EA) procedures.
EA procedures seek to ensure that decisions to authorize activities likely to have an impact on the environment are well-informed. EA procedures typically involve scientific documentation of foreseeable risks and public consultations. Since the 1970s, most countries have established mandatory EA frameworks. A vast range of potential environmental impacts are generally assessed, including for instance air, water and soil pollution affecting individuals, societies or ecosystems within the project's site and its vicinity. Beyond national borders, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has held that the due diligence of a State within its territory entails that a State must conduct an EA before authorizing an activity likely to cause significant transboundary environmental harm. 16 Debates have emerged in various countries about the potential contribution of EA to climate change mitigation. In many instances, EAs have been extended to include an assessment of the impact that a proposed activity would have on the climate system, or 'Climate Assessment' (CA). 17 In 2017 alone, national courts quashed the administrative approvals to the construction of a pipeline (United States), 18 a coal-fired power plant (South Africa) 19 and an airport (Austria) 20 on the ground that the relevant EA documentations had failed to include a CA. The same year, EU Member States were required to ensure that their domestic EA legislation involved a CA reflecting 'for example the nature and magnitude of greenhouse gas emissions.' 21 The importance of the topic was also recognized by the community of EA consultants, as the 37 th Annual Meeting of the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA), held in April 2017 in Montreal, was placed under the theme: 'impact assessment's contribution to the global efforts in addressing climate change.' 22 This article assesses whether conducting a CA is an obligation under customary international law. The question has not been previously addressed in any authoritative way. Unlike cases previously settled by the ICJ, 23 GHG emissions do not constitute 'transboundary' environmental harm -they do not affect any particular area, but rather the entire climate system. As the contribution of any given activity to climate change is always marginal and unlikely to have a measurable impact on any particular areas, populations or States, the relevance of EA as a tool for climate change mitigation is less obvious than in relation to transboundary environmental harm. For instance, the Draft Conclusions on the protection of the atmosphere adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in first reading in August 2018 provided only a passing and equivocal treatment to the question of an obligation of States to conduct an EA in relation to activities likely to have an unintended impact on the global environment. 24 This article identifies an emerging norm of customary international law requiring States to conduct a CA concerning activities carried out within a State's jurisdiction or control that risk causing excessive greenhouse gas emissions. This obligation cannot directly be deducted from the well-recognized obligation to conduct an EA in a transboundary context (or from the due diligence obligation of a State within its territory from which the latter obligation derives) because unique questions arise with regard to the relevance of EA to address incremental contributions to global environmental impacts. Therefore, in addition to retracing the recognition of EA in a transboundary context, this article reviews the general practice of States and its acceptance as law, as well as conceptual hurdles specific to CA. It thus intends to demonstrate that States' support to the conduct of CA is nearly sufficient for the formation of a norm of customary international law.
The article is organized as follows. As a background, section 2 describes the global recognition of EAs as a tool for environmental protection. Section 3 retraces the emergence of CAs as a norm of customary international law. Lastly, section 4 discusses common concerns relating to certain modalities of implementation of CA.
II. THE GLOBAL RECOGNITION OF EA PROCEDURES AS A TOOL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
As a background, this section shows the global recognition of EA procedures as a tool for environmental protection. The first subsection identifies EA procedures as a general trend in State practice. The second subsection retraces its recognition as an international law obligation in a transboundary context. The third subsection concludes on the relevance of these developments in relation to climate change mitigation.
A. EA Procedures as a General Practice
EA, as defined by the IAIA, is 'the process of identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating the bio-physical, social and other relevant effects of development proposals prior to major decisions being taken and commitments made.' 25 The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) describes EA as involving 'an examination, analysis and assessment of planned activities with a view to ensuring environmentally sound and sustainable development.' 26 EA typically involves an expert assessment and public consultations before a decision to authorize the proposed activity can be made, possibly with conditions. The origins of this tool are often traced back to the US National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, which directs federal agencies proposing any 'major Federal actions' capable of having a significant impact on the environment to conduct public consultation based on a 'detailed statement' 27 of this possible impact. This statement documents the likelihood and the nature of the impact, but also possible alterations or alternatives to the proposed activity which could mitigate the impact. The NEPA review is an 'ostensibly procedural commitment,' 28 which, as Judge Stevens noted, 'merely prohibits uninformed -rather than unwise -agency action.' 29 Its rationale is that a clear scientific assessment of the proposed activity and public scrutiny could permit balanced consideration for environmental concerns in sensitive activities.
In the half century since the adoption of NEPA, the idea that an EA should be carried out before a project is approved spread to US states 30 The no-harm principle requires States to implement reasonably appropriate measures or 'due diligence.' 44 At the very least, this due diligence obligation requires that a State do no less effort to avoid transboundary environmental harm than it does to avoid environmental harm within its own territory. 45 This means that, if a State has a statutory EA procedure that seeks to avoid or reduce harm, this procedure should apply equally whether the harm would occur within its territory or beyond its borders. More broadly, EA could be approached as a general requirement implied by the due diligence obligation of States to ensure that activities carried out within their jurisdiction do not cause transboundary environmental harm, whether or not a State has such a requirement to avoid or reduce environmental harm within its own territory. 46 UNEP has actively promoted the application of EA procedures to activities likely to cause transboundary environmental harms. In 1978, the agency adopted a guidance on the conservation and harmonious utilization of shared natural resources where it suggested that 'States should make environmental assessment before engaging in any activity with respect to a shared natural resource which may create a risk of significantly affecting the environment of another State or States sharing that resource.' 47 In 1987, the Goals and Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment called upon States to:
'conclude bilateral, regional or multilateral arrangements, as appropriate, so as to provide, on the basis of reciprocity, notification, exchange of information, and agreedupon consultation on the potential environmental effects of activities under their control or jurisdiction which are likely to significantly affect other States or areas beyond national jurisdiction.' 48 Since the 1980s, provisions were included in issue-specific treaties which reflected the growing recognition of the obligation of State to conduct EAs in relation to activities likely to cause transboundary environmental harm. In particular, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requires States, when planning activities which could cause significant harm to the marine environment, to 'assess the potential effects of such activities on the marine environment' and to 'communicate reports of the results of such assessments' to other States via competent international organizations. 49 The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty of 1991 contains detailed provisions on the EA which is to be conducted before any impactful activity can be undertaken in the Antarctic Treaty Area, including the circulation of information to all Parties and to a Committee for Environmental Protection. 50 A year later, a provision was also inserted in the Convention on Biological Diversity, calling upon States, 'as far as possible and as appropriate,' to introduce EIA procedures for projects likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity. 51 Furthermore, in 1991, the Member States of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) adopted a dedicated treaty on EIAs in a transboundary context in Espoo, Finland.
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The Espoo Convention provides that the 'Party of origin' of certain projects must notify the 'affected Party' if the project is likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary impact, leaving to the latter the option to participate in an EIA procedure that the former must conduct before authorizing the project. 53 The procedure must consist in the preparation of the EIA documentation, where the affected Party may be requested to provide information, followed by a phase of consultations, leading to a decision by the Party of origin. 54 This view was later confirmed by the ICJ. In its 2010 judgment in Pulp Mills, the ICJ recognized the existence of 'a requirement under general international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource.' 67 The Court added that 'due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and prevention which it implies, would not be considered to have been exercised' if a State did not undertake an EIA before approving a project with liable to affect transboundary environmental resources. 68 Yet, the Court stopped short from specifying what this procedure should contain; 69 in particular, it rejected Argentina's claim that Uruguay had an obligation to consult the Argentinian population likely to be affected by the proposed activity.
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In its 2015 judgment in Certain Activities, the ICJ noted again the existence of 'an obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment concerning activities carried out within a State's jurisdiction that risk causing significant harm to other States.' 71 It stated that this obligation was applicable 'generally to proposed activities which may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context.' 72 The ICJ noted that, where an EA reveals an actual risk of significant transboundary harm, the State planning to undertake the activity is required 'to notify and consult in good faith with the potentially affected States, where that is necessary to determine the appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate that risk.' 73 Overall, this judgment confirmed that compliance with the procedural obligation to conduct an EA is to be assessed separately from compliance with the substantive obligation not to cause transboundary environmental harm. In this case, the ICJ concluded that Costa Rica had violated its obligation to conduct an EA in a transboundary context even though no significant transboundary environmental harm had arisen from the realization of the project.
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C. The Significance of Existing Authorities to Climate Change
While Pulp Mills and Certain Activities regarded transboundary environmental harm affecting the territory of a third State, the obligation to conduct an EIA also applies in relation to activities which could affect areas beyond national jurisdiction. Treaty-based obligations to conduct an EA apply when harm could affect the Antarctic 75 or the high seas, 76 and the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment defined the no-harm principle as applying not only when damage affects the territory of another State, but also when it affects 'areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.' 77 In 2011, the Seabed Chamber of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Seas (ITLOS) in its Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area recognized that the ICJ's reasoning in a transboundary context in Pulp Mills 'may also apply to activities with an impact on the environment in an area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.' 78 EA is among the issues that the UN General Assembly decided to defer to the negotiations that it initiated in 2018 towards the adoption of an international legally binding instrument under UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. 79 Likewise, it is relatively well accepted that the no-harm principle applies to 'common concerns of humankind' 80 such as climate change. The obligation for a State to ensure that activities conducted within its jurisdiction do not cause transboundary environmental harm suggests a fortiori an obligation to ensure that such activities do not cause harm to the global environment as a whole. 81 Consistently, By contrast, there is little authority regarding the application of the obligation to conduct an EA in relation to common concerns. The UNFCCC only defines a very general commitment for Parties to '[t]ake climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions.' 86 The Convention on Biological Diversity goes arguably further, in relation to another common concern, 87 by requiring that its Parties establish EIA procedures. 88 None of these provisions, however, provides sufficient support, on its own, to the existence of a customary international law obligation to conduct an EA in relation to common concerns. 89 Nevertheless, the ILC's Draft Guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere suggest that 'States have the obligation to ensure that an environmental impact assessment is undertaken of proposed activities under their jurisdiction or control which are likely to cause significant adverse impact on the atmosphere in terms of … atmospheric degradation' 90 such as climate change. 91 The Commentary acknowledges the lack of relevant authority on the obligation to conduct an EA in a global environmental context, but it suggests that precedents developed in a transboundary context could apply 'a fortiori to those activities potentially causing global atmospheric degradation.'
92 While the Draft Guidelines mention 'intentional large-scale modification of the atmosphere' (i.e. geo-engineering activities) as an example, 93 they do not take a clear position on the application of this obligation in relation to activities that involve unintentional and typically smaller-scale degradation of the atmosphere through GHG emissions.
The a fortiori argument which forms the core of the ILC's analysis is valid with regard to a general substantive obligation such as the no-harm principle: as States must take measures to prevent transboundary harm, it is to be expected that they should also a fortiori take measures to prevent atmospheric degradation, as atmospheric degradation is of a similar nature and generally of greater concern than transboundary harm.
94 By contrast, this argument does not necessarily work when applied in relation to an instrumental obligation such as the obligation 86 UNFCCC (n 4) art 4.1(f). 87 Ibid, second recital; Convention on Biological Diversity (n 51), fourth recital. 88 Convention on Biological Diversity (n 51) 14(1)(a). 89 See N Craik, 'Principle 17' in JE Viñuales (ed), The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2015) 451, 458. 90 'Draft Guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere' (n 9) Guideline 4. 91 Ibid Guideline 1(c). 92 Ibid, commentary under guideline 4, para 6. 93 Ibid guideline 7. See also ibid, commentary under guideline 4, para 6. 94 See references cited in n 81.
to conduct an EA: it all depends, then, upon the relevance of the tool in relation to the case of greater concern, that is, the relevance of EA as a tool to avoid or reduce the contribution of a proposed activity to global environmental harm. In other words, before concluding that the obligation to conduct an EA applies a fortiori in relation to atmospheric degradation, the ILC would need to determine whether and to what extent EA is an effective tool to address atmospheric degradation. As this determination relates to identification of customary international law, it should be done from the perspectives of States. As appears through next sections, States have progressively accepted EA as a relevant tool for climate change mitigation.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF CA AS AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION
This section suggests that there is an emerging norm of customary international law according to which a State is required to carry out a CA before authorizing a proposed activity likely to contribute significantly to climate change. A norm of customary international law is constituted by the existence of a general practice of States accepted as law. 95 The first subsection reviews the growing trend in State practice, while the following subsection identifies evidence that this practice has increasingly been accepted as law. More technical questions relating to the scope and modalities of CA and possible objections to the feasibility and relevance of this procedure are discussed in the following section.
A. A Growing State Practice
A general practice, for the purpose of asserting the existence of a norm of customary international law, does not need to be uniform. Rather, as interpreted by the ILC, it should consist in a practice which is 'sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent.' 96 In most cases, original EA laws did not include specific provisions on climate change mitigation: whether the GHG emissions implied by a proposed activity had to be included in the EA was decided subsequently, through the interpretation of existing legal framework or sometimes their revision. Either way, developments have been slow, often incremental, yet generally steady and unidirectional. Today, the inclusion of consideration for GHG emissions in national EA procedures has become sufficiently widespread, representative and consistent to constitute a prevailing and, arguably, 'general' practice.
First of all, many EA laws require the assessment of all environmental impacts, in terms which are sufficiently broad to include GHG emissions. 97 This enabled courts to play an important role in identifying and interpreting a CA requirement in existing EA frameworks. In particular:
• • In the United Kingdom, the Queen's Bench Division confirmed that climate change was a relevant consideration before a local authority could consent to an increase in the capacity or in the number of flights at an airport. 99 • In New Zealand, the High Court held that a local government could consider the impact of a coal plant on climate change when deciding whether to authorize it. 100 • In South Africa, the High Court declared that the EIA for a coal-fired power plant should have included a climate change impact assessment. 101 • In Australia, the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of Victoria decided that the EIA of a coal power plant should document the GHG emissions which would result from its operations, 102 while the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales required the EIA of a coal mining project to include an assessment of the GHG emissions resulting from the end-use of the coal. 103 • In Austria, the Federal Administrative Court quashed the administrative approval for the construction of a third runway at Vienna's International Airport on the ground that the project's economic benefits did not outweigh its environmental impact, including on climate change. 104 This judgment was overturned by the Constitutional Court which, however, agreed that the impact of the project on climate change had to be taken into account. 105 Secondly, national governments have adopted guidelines and lawmakers have revised existing EA procedures in order to establish and clarify a CA requirement. In particular:
• In the United States, following some initiatives at the state level 106 and previous hints at the Federal level, 107 the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued draft guidance documents on consideration of the effects of climate change and GHG emissions in NEPA reviews in 1997, 108 117 See Bill C-69, 'An Act to enact the Impact Assessment Act and the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, to amend the Navigation Protection Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts', as passed by the House of Commons on 20 June 2018. As of February 2019, this bill was still being reviewed by the Senate. 118 Although the EU is not a State, it exercises the powers that EU Member States transferred to it, including the power to develop legal requirements on the conduct of EA. 119 change and biodiversity into, respectively, EIA and SEA. 121 The following year, the EIA directive was revised with the addition of a requirement that EIA reports document 'the impact of the project on climate (for example the nature and magnitude of greenhouse gas emissions).' 122 Thirdly, CA has percolated as a practice in some countries in the absence of any judicial precedent or formal legal development. For instance, China's 2002 EA Law and enforcing regulations contain no reference to climate change, 123 and there is no authoritative judicial decision on the matter. Nevertheless, two documents among the many issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) to guide the implementation of particular aspects of the EA act imply, almost accidentally, that China's EA should include a CA. One guidance document suggests that technical reviews of EIA reports should consider the feasibility and effectiveness of any measure described in the project which seeks to reduce GHG emissions.
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Another guidance document includes carbon dioxide (but not other GHGs) among the air pollutants to be documented in SEAs. 125 In practice, it has been reported that about a fifth of SEA reports involve some sort of consideration for GHG emissions, although this rarely amount to a systematic appraisal. 126 Scholars have advocated for a reform of China's EA framework towards a more effective and systematic approach of CA.
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Fourthly, this general trend was reflected in the practice of international organizations. 128 The World Bank, for instance, adopted internal rules in August 2016 which require an assessment of the GHG emissions as part of the environmental and social assessment of a project for which support is sought. 129 133 Consistently, the Equator Principles, which provide an industry benchmark for EA in financial institutions, require consideration for the GHG emissions of activities for which support is sought. 134 Yet, while the inclusion of GHG in EA procedures is a clear trend, it is not a universal practice. A few States simply do not have a statutory EA framework at all. 135 Other, developing States have a statutory framework but lack the resources to implement it consistently. 136 In yet other jurisdictions, debates on the inclusion of considerations for GHG emissions in EAs do not seem to have sparked off yet. In India, for instance, the 'Notification' defining the regulatory framework for the federal EIA procedure leaves it to ad hoc Expert Appraisal Committees to determine the Terms of Reference of the EIA study, which is to 'address … all relevant environmental concerns.' 137 In practice, Terms of Reference generally do not include considerations for GHG emissions, even in the most relevant projects. A petition pending before the National Green Tribunal since 2017, but undecided as of February 2019, seeks to direct the Government to mainstream considerations for climate change mitigation in the EIA Notification. 138 In Hong Kong, the scope of EIAs is, in practice, confined to a list of issues included in a 'Technical Memorandum,' which does not include any proxy for the inclusion of transboundary or global environmental concerns. 139 Here again, the question was never brought to a court, and it has rarely been raised in local debates. 140 The absence of CA in these and other jurisdictions has more to do with political inertia, hesitancy or, at most, reluctance, than with a deliberate exclusion.
By contrast, at least two States have specifically excluded considerations for GHG emissions from domestic EA frameworks. In 2002, the Environmental Court of New Zealand expressed 'considerable disquiet about the efficacy, appropriateness and reasonableness' of a condition for GHG emission limitation or reduction that regional authorities had imposed on a gas-fired power plant. 141 The Court considered that climate change mitigation should be carried out exclusively through national policies as only those could 'guarantee an efficiency compatible with achieving best social, environmental and economic outcomes.'
142 Two years later, this approach was endorsed by a Government Bill amending the Resource Management Act to exclude considerations for 'the effects on climate change of discharges into air of greenhouse gases.' 143 In the government's view, this amendment would avoid duplication of efforts and reduce administrative costs, as a national emissions trading scheme would ensure that New Zealand complies with its quantified emissions limitation and reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol.
144 A similar development occurred in Kazakhstan where, in 2011, a statutory reform specifically excluded 'the impact of greenhouse gas emissions'
145 from the scope of the EAs as the country was establishing a carbon market.
Ironically, even where EAs do not document the adverse effects of GHG emissions, they tend to document the benefits of emission reductions where applicable. In New Zealand, the same amendment to the Resource Management Act allows consideration for the effects of GHG emissions in renewable energy projects to the extent that such project enables a reduction of such emissions. 146 Likewise, in Hong Kong, reduction in GHG emissions was abundantly documented in the EIA reports relating to a small windfarm project 147 and to the conversion of a coal-fired power plant into gas-fired power plant with higher carbon efficiency. proposed activities, it is unclear why they should not also recognize the costs of additional GHG emissions in other proposed activities.
B. An Incomplete Acceptance as Law Acceptance as law (opinio juris) distinguishes a custom from mere usage or habit. 149 As interpreted by the ILC, this requirement is that 'the practice in question must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation.'
150 It is notoriously difficult to establish this subjective element, if only because States are actually composed of many individuals with different beliefs and motivations. 151 It is generally understood, as international courts and tribunals have held in successive cases, 152 that States have accepted as law an obligation to carry an EA at least in a transboundary context. The question here is whether States have accepted a similar obligation in the context of a global environmental harm, namely GHG emissions.
Treaties and their interpretation by States can be relevant to identifying acceptance as law, in particular when they are framed not merely as a trade-off between the interests of their parties, but rather as the recognition of a general norm. 153 Yet, treaties provide limited support to the acceptance of EA in the context of climate change as law. Climate change treaties, for instance, do not impose or recognize a mandatory EA procedure. To the contrary, the Preamble of the UNFCCC recognizes 'the principle of sovereignty of States in international cooperation to address climate change.'
154 Accordingly, the UNFCCC regime has generally been left it for States to determine how best to achieve mitigation outcomes.
Nevertheless, some provisions in climate change treaties could be taken as expression of a sense of obligation. Thus, the UNFCCC suggests that all Parties should '[t]ake climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions.' 155 A similar language was echoed in the Sustainable Development Goals when the UN General Assembly recognized the need to '[i]ntegrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning.' 156 Other treaty provisions calling States to take relevant measures appear to imply an obligation to conduct CA if and inasmuch as it is an effective tool for climate change mitigation. Thus, Annex I Parties committed under the UNFCCC to 'adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change,' 157 whereas all the Parties to the Paris Agreement are to 'pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives' 158 of their successive NDCs. On the other hand, no State appears to have mentioned EA in their NDC as a tool for climate change mitigation (although a few States highlighted the need to integrate consideration for climate change adaptation in EAs). 159 149 ILC, 'Customary International Law' (n 65) conclusion 9, para 2. See generally the references n 95. 150 ILC, 'Customary International Law' (n 65) conclusion 9, para 1. 151 Ibid conclusions 11 to 14. 152 See references cited in notes 67, 68 and 71. 153 ILC, 'Customary International Law' (n 65) conclusion 10, para 2, and conclusion 11, para 1. See generally the references mentioned n 65. 154 UNFCCC (n 4) recital 10. 155 Ibid art 4.1(f). 156 UNGA Res. 70/1 (2015), goal 13.2. 157 Ibid art 4.2(a). See also Kyoto Protocol (n 5) art 2.1. 158 Paris Agreement (n 6) art 4.2. 159 By contrast, some biennial reports and national communications under the UNFCCC mention EA as a tool for climate change mitigation. See for instance the UK's Seventh National Communication Alternatively, the regime of the Espoo Convention could be relevant in assessing acceptance of CA as law. The Espoo Convention itself appears to focus on typical cases of transboundary harm confined to a geographical area. Although the convention includes 'climate' as one of the dimensions of a project's potential impacts, 160 'transboundary impact' is defined as any impact 'not exclusively of a global nature.' 161 Nonetheless, the Parties to the Espoo Convention are supportive to a broader vision of EIA which may extend to the context of climate change. The Guidance on the Practical Application of the Espoo Convention, adopted by its Parties, suggests, through somewhat of a stretch, that 'activities with linkages to climate change' may be amongst the 'long-range transboundary impacts' to be assessed under the Convention, 162 rather than impacts exclusively of a global nature excluded from its scope. By contrast to the Espoo Convention, the Kiev Protocol on SEA, adopted about a decade later, relates to activities likely to have significant environmental effects (including effects on the climate) notwithstanding whether these effects are local, transboundary or global in nature. 164 A workplan, adopted at the same meetings, introduced measures to raise awareness, exchange experience and train professionals on the opportunity of integrating climate change in EAs, in particular SEAs. 165 Overall, a meeting of the UNECE Member States at the same occasion outlined a common vision of SEA as 'a key tool for the development of national climate change action and planning, and for the incorporation of specific climate change mitigation and adaptation measures into regional development and (December 2017), section 5.4.7; Sweden's third Biennial Report (December 2017), section 3.2.10; Iceland's Seventh National Communication and Third Biennial Report (2018) section 4.2.10. 160 Espoo Convention (n 52) art 1(vii) 161 Ibid art 1(viii). 162 Some other treaty provisions could also be taken to suggest acceptance of CA as a customary obligation. In particular, it is notable that UNCLOS's definition of pollution of the marine environment is wide enough to encompass some of the impacts of climate change on the seas, such as warming, acidification and sea-level rise.
168 Accordingly, the obligation of States to assess the potential effects of activities which may cause substantial pollution to the marine environment under article 206 of UNCLOS may be interpreted as requiring EAs of proposed activities likely to contribute significantly to climate change. Likewise, given the impact of climate change on ecosystems, the provision of the Convention on Biological Diversity on EIA could be interpreted as encompassing GHG emissions. 169 However, rather than treaties, it is arguably the very conduct of States which provides the strongest evidence of a growing acceptance of EA as an obligation in the context of climate change. 170 A distinction needs to be drawn between a conduct adopted by a State in pursuance of its own interests and that adopted in pursuance to what a State views as its duty, possibly against its immediate interests. 171 States pursue no immediate interests by conducting EAs to avoid or reduce the impact of proposed activities on climate change. The adoption of CA procedures in various countries and international organizations cannot be explained by courtesy, comity, political expediency or convenience. 172 Efforts to comply with national commitments on climate change mitigation can also be excluded when the State has no quantified commitment, 173 or inasmuch as the GHG emissions which are the object of the CA take place beyond the State's territory (hence outside the geographical scope of the State's quantified commitment), 174 or beyond the time horizon of any national commitment. 175 Rather, States' conduct generally implies their acceptance of CA as a duty. 166 168 See UNCLOS (n 49) art 1.1(4), defining pollution of the marine environment as 'the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment … which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life….' On the impacts of climate change on the marine environment, see generally IPCC (n 2) 40-44. 169 See n 51 and accompanying text. 170 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), merits, 1986 ICJ Rep 14, para 204 ('a practice illustrative of belief'). On the relation between treaties and the formation of customs, see references cited n 65. 171 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (n 170) para 208, where the Court notes that the conduct of the United States is 'justified … on the political level.' 172 ILC, 'Customary International Law' (n 65) commentary under conclusion 9, para 3. 173 See e.g. Mid States Coalition (n 98). 174 See e.g. Gray (n 103). 175 Initial NDCs do not extend beyond 2030, whereas infrastructure projects often have a much longer life expectancy.
A possible difficulty with the identification of an obligation to conduct a CA, as Neil Craik noted, is that of 'determining to which States the duty is owed, and as a result, which States have a right to be notified and be consulted.' 176 In a transboundary context, the obligation to conduct an EA is owed the State likely to be affected. 177 In relation to a common concern such as climate change, where the impact would not specially affect any distinct area, population or State, the obligation to conduct an EA -like the more general obligation to prevent excessive GHG emissions -is as an obligation owed to the international community as a whole (erga omnes obligation), 178 and any State has the right to seek the performance of this obligation.
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Yet, this does not necessarily mean that every State has a right to be notified and to be consulted, as the obligation to notify and to consult another State can inferred from the obligation to conduct an EA only 'where that is necessary to determine the appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate' the risk.
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To conclude, there appears to be a relatively well-established general practice of States and an increasing acceptance as law in support of a customary obligation to conduct a CA, though it is not clear weather this obligation has yet fully emerged. What continues to hinder a complete recognition of this norm is the difficulty of adapting EA to the particular nature of GHG emissions as a global cumulative environmental harm. Consequently, it is essential to determine whether EA is actually a relevant tool for climate change mitigation.
IV. CONCEPTUALIZING EA AS AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION
This final section discusses some of the central questions faced when integrating climate change mitigation in EAs. A first subsection discusses the determination of a threshold beyond which GHG emissions are sufficiently 'significant' to justify the conduct of a CA. A second subsection examines what could constitute an appropriate deliberation process in the context of global cumulative impacts. Lastly, a third subsection assesses the ability of EAs to identify pertinent ways to limit or reduce GHG emissions. The discussion of these three questions, supported by a review of State practice, demonstrates the relevance of CA as a tool for climate change mitigation and suggests that a complete acceptance of CA as an obligation under general international law is really just a matter of time. 176 Craik, 'Principle 17' (n 89) 458. 177 
A. Assessing the Significance of the GHG Emissions Caused by a Proposed Activity
Perhaps the most obvious objection to the use of EA as a tool for climate change mitigation relates to the difficulty of asserting the significance of GHG emissions caused by a given activity.
The question of the significance of an activity's GHG emissions is typically raised in relation to the selection of activities that need to undergo a thorough assessment ('screening' phase of the EA) and to the identification of the issues to be documented ('scoping'). At either stage, the finding that an activity could cause a significant environmental impact calls for additional steps to document this possible impact and consider revisions of the proposed activity to avoid or reduce this impact or additional mitigation measures. The magnitude of the GHG emissions likely to result from a proposed activity should determine the degree of scrutiny that the activity should undergo. Crucially, significance is also to be considered at the decision-making stage, where the impact of the proposed activity on the climate system is to be taken into account and weighed along with other costs and benefits.
Taken in isolation, a single activity is unlikely to have a measurable impact on planetary systems, as the increase in the GHG concentrations in the atmosphere results from innumerable sources scattered among and within countries. This '"drop in the ocean" problem' 181 is most obvious with regard to (project-level) EIAs -and this may be one of the reasons why the Minsk Declaration adopted by the Member States of the UNECE promoted the role of SEA to mitigate climate change. 182 However, this problem surely concerns most SEAs on plans, programmes and policies as well. Only in a few exceptional cases could a policy be considered to have a more-or-less discernible impact on the entire climate system. 183 The difficulty of assessing the significance of GHG emissions in a proposed activity is the most common ground for excluding consideration for GHG emissions from EA. An instance amongst many, the Federal Court of Australia in Anvil Hill noted that no significant causal relation could be established between the GHG emissions caused by a single coal mine and a measurable increase in global average temperature. On this ground, the Court concluded that the EA did not have to contemplate the impact of the project on the climate system. 184 Likewise, in New Zealand, the statutory exclusion of GHG emission from the scope of EA has been interpreted on the ground that a single project's GHG emissions could never be significant: 'given … the infinitesimal contribution which any particular project could make, there could 182 See n 166. 183 Most likely the strategy on power generation annexed to China's Five-Year Plans. China's energy sector contributed an estimated 9.5 GtCO2eq, representing close to a fifth of a total of 48.9 GtCO2eq global GHG emissions (including land-use change and forestry) in 2014. See World Resource Institute, 'CAIT Climate Data Explorer' (2018) https://www.wri.org/resources/data-sets/cait-countrygreenhouse-gas-emissions-data. China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) conducts some consultations with stakeholders during the drafting of the five-year plan, though no complete EA process. By contrast, neither the US, nor the EU has a unique, centralized energy policy. 184 be no demonstrable linkage between GHG emissions associated with any particular project and climate change generally.' 185 But, as mentioned above, while a subsequent legislative reform endorsed this reasoning, it also permitted consideration for the benefits of emission reductions arising from renewable energy projects, 186 even though the contribution of such projects to climate change mitigation is equally likely to be infinitesimal.
On the other side of the world, a debate arose in relation to the significance of the GHG emissions caused by the Kearl Oil Sands Project in the Canadian Province of Alberta. The 2005 EIA report estimated that the project's operations would cause 3.8 MtCO2eq per year, representing respectively 1.7% and 0.5% of Alberta and Canada's GHG emissions. 187 In 2007, a Joint Review Panel in charge of making recommendations to the responsible Federal agency under the relevant EA legislation 188 estimated that this impact was not significant and recommended approval of the project. 189 In a subsequent application for juridical review, the Federal Court remitted the matter to the same Panel with the direction of providing a rationale for its conclusion that the project's GHG emissions were not significant. 190 This led the Joint Review Panel to adopt an addendum to its Report where it highlighted the lack of evidence that the project's GHG emissions would have any significant impact on the entire climate system. 191 In June 2008, the relevant authorities approved the project based on the conclusion that it was 'not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects.' 192 The most convincing response to the 'drop in the ocean' problem is arguably to situate it in the context of a broader debate on cumulative effects. Many environmental issues do not occur as the result of any single action, but because of the incremental addition of small impacts by multiple actors. 193 Most EA frameworks require consideration for the activity's cumulative impact, that is, 'the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.' 194 Even though the implementation of such assessments is not always entirely satisfactory, 195 there is at least a broad consensus that EA cannot ignore the incremental contribution of an activity to a broader environmental issue. The effectiveness of EA would be considerably reduced if it was to turn a blind eye to other stress factors affecting the environment in which the proposed activity is to take place. As Judge Betty B. Fletcher noted in Center for Biological Diversity, '[t]he impact of [GHG] emissions on climate change is precisely the kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to conduct.' 196 The Environment Court of New Zealand once adopted the same position, when it held that, 'since [GHG] emissions all contribute cumulatively to the same global atmosphere, every small contribution makes a difference.' 197 Even though a given activity may only have a minor effect on climate change, human activities are collectively causing tremendous harm: GHG emissions need to be reduced whenever reasonably practical.
Assessing the cumulative effect of an activity's GHG emissions requires, first of all, documentation of the GHG emissions resulting from this activity. A number of methodologies have been developed in recent years to facilitate the documentation of GHG emissions arising from virtually any given activity. 198 The stringency of this assessment should depend on the nature of the activity: strenuous efforts to document GHG emissions which are 'vanishingly small' would serve no useful purpose, 199 but proposed activities which entail massive GHG emissions should attract the most careful scrutiny. 200 In some cases, the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment concedes that a summary qualitative assessment of the source of GHG emissions would be sufficient, although it should be 'robust, transparent and justifiable.' 201 A quantified assessment of the GHG emissions likely to result from a proposed activity should only be required when these emissions are likely to exceed a certain threshold. Unsurprisingly, State practice varies considerably regarding the determination of this threshold, which is generally set somewhere between 1 and 100 kilo-tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year. 202 The duration of the activity ought also to be relevant. Beside absolute levels of emissions, any departure from industry benchmark should also command close scrutiny.
It is also largely understood that the documentation of the GHG emissions entailed by a proposed activity has to have 'a wide scope and a broad purpose' 203 in order to shed light on the opportunity to carry out the activity and the possibility of reducing these emissions. In addition to the GHG emissions caused directly by the activity, it is generally accepted that an EA should document the impacts of 'connected actions' 204 which have a 'reasonably close causal relationship' with the project. 205 Besides on-site emissions ('scope 1' emissions), indirect GHG emissions resulting from the generation of electricity purchased by the project ('scope 2 emissions') or from any other supporting activities or infrastructure ('scope 3 emissions') may be included in the documentation of the GHG emissions. 206 Thus, two US Appeal courts held that the EIAs for the construction of a railway 207 and a pipeline 208 destined to be used for transportation of fossil fuels should document the GHG emissions which would result from the use of these fossil fuels. Likewise, a US district court found that the EIA for the construction and operation of electricity transmission lines to connect two coal-fired power plants in Mexico with South California's power grid should document the GHG emissions from these power plants. 209 The Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, followed by others, held that the EIA of a coalmine should consider the GHG emissions from the burning of the coal by third parties. 210 In addition, a meaningful assessment of the GHG emissions which would result from a proposed activity should compare these emissions with benchmarks relevant at the scale and in the context of the activity. A GHG emissions arising from a given project appear like a 'drop in the ocean' when compared with global GHG emissions, but so do its economic benefits in the context of the global economy and in the long history of human civilization. 211 The same amount of GHG emissions may appear disproportionate when compared with GHG emissions of similar projects, or with the sum of GHG emissions in a region or country. It may also be useful to relate the GHG emissions attributable to an activity with the efforts and resources invested in the same region or country to reduce GHG emissions. 212 For instance, a study commissioned by the Hong Kong Airport Authority showed that the GHG emissions resulting from a single project -the construction of a third runway in Hong Kong's International Airport -would cancel out two-thirds of the GHG emissions reduction resulting from the region's mitigation efforts by 2030. 213 An EA should, at the very least, ensure that an activity's GHG emissions are consistent with relevant commitments and targets, in particular the mitigation targets contained in NDCs. 214 Thus, the Supreme Court of California held that 'consistency' with state-wide emission reduction goals could be a 'legally permissible criterion' to determine the significance of GHG emissions arising from the large-scale real estate development project. 215 Likewise, the High Court of South Africa considered that an assessment of the GHG emissions that a proposed coal-fired power plant would generate was necessary to ensure that the project 'fit … South Africa's peak, plateau and decline trajectory as outlined in the NDC and its commitment to build cleaner and more efficient than existing power stations.' 216 However, these two judgments also recognized the complexity of assessing the consistency of a project or programme with an economy-wide goal. California's Supreme Court noted that, as energy efficiency can more easily be reduced in new buildings than by retrofitting existing ones, 'a greater degree of reduction may be needed from new land use projects rather than from the economy as a whole.'
217 Similarly, the High Court of South Africa ordered the defendants to produce a 'professionally researched climate change impact report' 218 which would determine whether the project could fit within South Africa's plan to implement its international commitment on climate change mitigation. Other Courts noted that compliance with economy-wide targets helped little in the assessment of the significance of the GHG emissions likely to arise from the extension of an airport 219 or the construction of a stretch of highway.
In any case, national commitments and other national or subnational targets provide a relatively undemanding benchmark for evaluating the GHG emissions arising from proposed activities. It is well-recognized that the sum of current national commitments on climate change mitigation is far from enough to achieve the global objectives of avoiding dangerous interference with the climate system 221 or holding the increase in global average temperature well below 2°C, possibly at 1.5°C. 222 It was argued elsewhere that national commitments specifically agreed upon by States, for instance through their NDCs, do not substitute to their obligations under general international law; rather, negotiated instruments under the UNFCCC regime seek to induce incremental steps towards compliance with States' obligation not to cause significant transboundary environmental harm. 223 National commitments surely do not create a right to emit any given quantity of GHG emissions. 224 In application to their broader obligation to mitigate climate change under general international law, States must do every effort possible to overachieve these targets. 225 Likewise, the ratchet and review mechanism established by the Paris Agreement implies that States must prepare themselves to communicate and achieve further, more ambitious mitigation commitment beyond the timehorizon of their present NDC. 226 Therefore, the GHG emissions arising from a project should not escape a careful assessment simply because they are consistent with relevant national commitments on climate change mitigation. 227 Even when a State is already well on the way to achieve its commitments, any reasonable step to reduce GHG emissions further should be considered until the achievement of global mitigation objectives is secured. 228 As an alternative way of evaluating an activity's GHG emissions, some have explored the option of attributing a fixed monetary value to a unit of emissions, as a way to compare the 'cost' of a proposed activity on the climate system with its benefits. Thus, in 2010, several US agencies adopted a document seeking to estimate the 'social cost of carbon' to support regulatory impact analysis under Executive Order 12866. 229 This led a District Court to overturn a project approval on the basis that the NEPA review did not include an economic valuation of the GHG emissions caused by a proposed extension of a coal mine. 230 The difficulty with this approach is that an economic valuation of GHG emissions necessarily relies on a range of shaky assumptions, for instance with regard to the discount rate applicable when assessing the present value of future harms, the valuation of non-economic harms affecting human societies or ecosystems, the treatment of fundamental uncertainties about the responses of planetary systems to GHG emissions, and even the ethical appropriateness of, effectively, putting non-economic values such as life or biological diversity on the market. 231 Likewise, proposed activities often have social or even environmental benefits which do not have a market value. The risk is that a monetarization of the costs and benefits of a proposed activity would displace essential debates from political institutions to expert bodies and, possibly, put a disproportionate emphasis on tangible economic benefits at the expense of a sustainable development.
In conclusion, there is no unique, universally agreed-upon method for determining when the GHG emissions resulting from a proposed activity are significant enough to justify a CA, or even to prevent the approval of the project. The emerging obligation to conduct a CA leaves it largely to States to determine a relevant threshold of significance. Such determination should arguably be made on the basis of national circumstances and taking into account States' common but differentiated responsibilities and national capacities, 232 with developed States taking the lead towards more stringent assessments. States are also to decide how best to scope the assessment, including with regard to off-site emissions, and to decide of any appropriate method for the valuation of these emissions and their comparison with other anticipated costs and benefits. This margin of appreciation, however, is not so loose as to render the rule entirely meaningless, and it appears that a hard core of activities -most evidently any projects resulting in more than 100 kilo-tonnes of carbon-dioxide equivalent of on-site greenhouse gas emissions per year -are consistently viewed in most States and under most circumstances as requiring the conduct of a CA.
B. Deliberative Process in the Absence of Direct Harm
Along with an evidence-based assessment of environmental impacts, EA procedures seek to favour a consensual collective decision. In a domestic context, EA laws often promote public participation, 233 which, within the boundaries of a political community, may implement a form of deliberative democracy. 234 Yet, as Craik noted, '[t]he degree and effectiveness of participation is influenced by the broader culture of openness with which administrative decisions are made in the country in question.' 235 While public participation is a central feature of EA procedures in Western democracies, it often boils down to mere formalities elsewhere. 236 Transposing this component of EA procedures in a transboundary context has revealed problematic.
The Espoo Convention and its Kiev Protocol suggest that deliberation should involve a notification of the States likely to be affected by the proposed activity, 237 an offer to enter into consultations 238 and the creation of opportunities for the public in areas likely to be affected in foreign countries to take an active part in the deliberations. 239 Yet, by contrast with the obligations of notification and consultation, the obligation to create an opportunity for the participation of a foreign public is arguably an aspect of the Espoo Convention and its Kiev Protocol which goes beyond customary international law, 240 building upon the particular context of the UNECE, 241 in particular the shared democratic tradition of UNECE Member States -or even, in the case of the EU and its direct sphere of influence, broadly harmonized legal systems. Even in this context, the implementation of the provisions of the Espoo Convention and its Kiev Protocol on public participation has been hindered by issues of coordination between the Party of origin and the affected Party, whose respective roles are not clearly defined in the treaties. 242 Other instruments relating to EA in a transboundary context generally contain less ambitious provisions on deliberations, especially for what regards the participation of foreign populations. 243 While Principle 19 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development relates to notification and consultations, it does not mention public participation in a transboundary context. 244 The UNEP Goals and Principles of EIA of 1987 approach consultation as a desirable objective rather than a current practice. 245 The ILC's Draft Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm elaborate on notification, consultation and public information, but not on public participation. 246 The draft of a Global Pact for the Environment does not mention any form of notification, consultation or participation of a foreign public in relation to the obligation of States to conduct an EA. 247 Likewise, in a 2010 judgment, the ICJ could find 'no legal obligation to consult the affected populations'
248 applicable in the case of Pulp Mills. Instead, the Court held that 'it is for each State to determine … the specific content of an [EIA] , having regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment.' 249 Thus, the ICJ implied that an EA could be conducted in a transboundary context without consultation with, and possibly even without notification of the concerned States. 250 In its 2015 judgment in Certain Activities, the ICJ clarified that the State conducting an EA in a transboundary context 'is required … to notify, and consult with, the potentially affected State in good faith, where that is necessary to determine the appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate that risk. ' 251 This would presumably include circumstances where the harm is unfolding in the affected country in ways that may not be well-known in the country of origin and where cooperation can effectively mitigate the harm.
This deliberative process needs to take different forms when applied in the context of climate change. The impact of GHG emissions is not limited to one or several States; all States are affected, though none of them directly. As the consequences of GHG emissions do not depend on the nature of the activity from which they result, notification and consultation in relation to each proposed activity would not be necessary to determine measures to prevent or mitigate the harm. States already have various forums where they can express their views on how GHG emissions from other countries affect the global environment and their national interests; 252 no useful purpose would be served by creating an additional forum to express these same views each time a GHG-intensive activity is under consideration.
As implied by the ICJ judgments in Pulp Mills and in Certain Activities, consultations with a third State and a fortiori the participation of the public affected in another country are not an essential element of an EA procedure in a transboundary context. 253 If public participation is the 'soul' 254 of the EA in a domestic context, its function is not to ensure the direct representation of all stakeholders haggling for their own interests. EAs are often concerned with purely environmental harm or with harm affecting future generations, neither of which could be directly represented through public participation. Public participation, in this context, seeks to promote a meaningful deliberation among reasonable, well-informed citizens who, looking beyond their own interests, reflect on their vision of the common good.
Thus, in the context of climate change, a deliberative process confined to the State in which jurisdiction the activity is proposed could very well include careful considerations for the impacts of a proposed activity beyond national borders and present generations. Such deliberations could be an opportunity for debates as to whether the benefits of a proposed activity would justify the GHG emissions that it could cause. It could also help ensure that decision-makers let no reasonable step to avoid or decrease GHG emissions unexplored. The circumstances in which these debates take place would differ in every country, reflecting a wide range of political and economic as well as social and cultural circumstances. 255 These deliberations would inevitably involve deeply political questions, in particular through arbitrages between alternative activities likely to cause GHG emissions such as -at the risk of oversimplifying -between an airport to provide fast transportation to the few and a coal-fired power plant to provide cheap electricity to the many. CA could thus ensure that the need to decrease and cease excessive GHG emissions is properly conveyed in relevant decision-making processes.
As such, international engagement is arguably less central in EAs in the context of climate change than it is in a transboundary context, where associating affected populations and their national government to the decision-making may help avoiding or mitigating harm. In practice, CA do not generally involve the notification and consultation of foreign governments, let alone the participation of foreign populations. In a rather unique case, Micronesia took advantage of a Czech statute to demand that the Czech Government enter consultations in relation to the latter's project to renovate a coal-fired power plant in Prunéřov. This intervention invited sufficient public scrutiny to shame the Czech government into altering its project substantially. 256 Yet, bilateral consultations do not reflect the global and diffuse nature of the harm caused by GHG emissions. Micronesia was not 'affected' by the Prunéřov project in any tangible way.
In comparable situations, States have generally inclined towards giving an opportunity to all States and often their population to access to information about the proposed activity, thus enabling them, at least informally, to express their views. For instance, the EA procedure established under in the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty requires EA reports to be circulated to an intergovernmental committee and to each Party to the Protocol, 253 See notes 249 and 251. 254 Compare with Craik, The International Law of EIA (n 28) 31, according to whom public participation is the 'soul' of EIA. 255 which, in turn, is to make the report publicly available within its jurisdiction. 257 UNCLOS requires its Parties to communicate EA reports 'to the competent international organizations, which should make them available to States,' 258 although this treaty does not create any specific mechanism. In practice, these reports are often communicated to regional seas commissions established under regional agreements. 259 The Convention on Biological Diversity encourages the conclusion of bilateral, regional or multilateral arrangements for notification, exchange of information and consultations on proposed activities likely to have a significant impact on biological diversity. 260 Yet, no agreement established any institutional mechanism for notification and consultations as far as climate change is concerned. By analogy to UNCLOS, a State conducting a CA could take the initiative to communicate a report to a competent international organization such as the UNFCCC Secretariat or UNEP in lieu of notification and to invite the organization to gather views in lieu of consultations. Nevertheless, transnational deliberations would certainly be more effective if an institutional arrangement could be established, for instance in the form of a registry recording CA reports and gathering views by national governments and, possibly, authorized non-governmental organizations. This arrangement would ideally be made through a dedicated treaty, but a non-binding decision under an existing framework -for instance a decision of the Parties to the Espoo Convention -would be sufficient to create an optional institutional framework. 261 In conclusion, there is no clear rule on how deliberations are to be conducted in relation to CA. Consultations of the national population is an essential trait of the EA process itself, and, by extension, of the CA. Beyond this, there is little practice and no established rule on how foreign governments are to be notified and consulted, and whether foreign populations are to be provided an opportunity to participate. It is certainly desirable, but probably not required, that CAs be opened to extraneous interventions, in particular constructive recommendations and offers of financial or technical assistance.
C. Effects on the Final Decisions
EA is about procedure more than about substance. Under most EA laws, a decision-maker, having taken notice of the impacts of a proposed activity on climate change or any other environmental concerns, may nevertheless approve it. 262 Often, CA makes no difference.
For example, less than a year after the High Court of South Africa overturned the administrative approval for the construction of the Thabametsi coal-fired power plant in Limpopo on the ground that the EIA had failed to assess foreseeable GHG emissions, 264 a new administrative approval was issued based on a CA of the project. 265 While acknowledging that the project would result in significant GHG emissions, the approval authority concluded that such harm 'were outweighed by the benefit to the country of having the additional energy-generation capacity.' 266 Courts typically do not interfere with the administrative appraisal of the opportunity to approve the activity, unless the decision is procedurally flawed or evidently unreasonable. 267 On the other hand, one should not expect every single CA to lead to significant changes in the proposed activity. CA are useful even if only a tiny minority of the proposed activities are substantially altered as a result. In rare cases, an assessment of the GHG emissions may tilt the balance and lead decision-makers to withhold approval. More frequently, a CA may suggest conditions on the approval with the view of reducing GHG emissions. In some cases, activities were approved subject to a very general condition, such as the obligation for a project's proponent to 'implement all reasonable and feasible measures to minimize the release of [GHG] emissions from the [project] site.' 268 A review of Canada's practice revealed conditions ranging from the use of best technologies, to the adoption of a detailed GHG emissions management plan. 269 Less directly, in anticipation to CA, the proponents of large projects are likely to adopt alternatives which reduce GHG emissions, for instance by using the latest technology available when economically feasible. There is also some evidence that innovative conditions imposed as the result of a CA can promote new ideas which are then endorsed by lawmakers and imposed as a matter of general policy to all similar activities.
270
V. CONCLUSION
This article has documented the emergence of a customary international law obligation of States to conduct CA in relation to proposed activities which are likely to result in significant GHG emissions. The diffusion of EA as a tool for climate change mitigation is clearly a desirable development: it makes little doubt that any State is better off if every State conducts EAs to assess the implications of proposed activities for climate change, considering relevant alterations or alternative to proposed GHG-intensive activities, and thus more broadly prompting political deliberations on how important projects, plans, programmes and policies may take part in a long-term low GHG emissions development strategy. 271 EAs may contribute to bottom-up awareness-raising, where local authorities often play a leading role, in consultation with civil society organizations and citizens, to think about the many concrete steps that need to be taken in order to decrease and, eventually, cease GHG emissions, as a way to, literally, reinvent the world.
The developments documented in this article showed that the debate on whether EAs could be used as a tool for climate change mitigation is gradually turning into a debate on how this could best be done. In this respect, a number of thorny questions remain open, for instance regarding the assessment of significance, the method of appraisal or the possibility of opening up deliberations to foreign States or non-State actors. These debates are sparking off simultaneously in multiple countries in similar ways, though often in isolation. This suggests -at the risk of concluding this article on a cliché -that more research is needed to document, analyse and compare the developments that are rapidly taking place around the world in this regard. Comparative scholarship could help cross-fertilizing national debates on the modalities of CA and, thus, consolidate State practice towards an effective and consistent use of EA as a tool for climate change mitigation.
